Construction and Surety Law by Reed, Toni Scott & Jones, Austin D.
SMU Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 7
2002
Construction and Surety Law
Toni Scott Reed
Austin D. Jones
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toni Scott Reed, et al., Construction and Surety Law, 55 SMU L. Rev. 775 (2002)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol55/iss3/7




I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 775
II. MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIENS ....... 776
III. CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES .................. 782
IV. CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED WARRANTY
ISSUES IN CONSTRUCTION .......................... 785
V. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT.. 789
VI. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND CGL COVERAGE
ISSU E S .................................................. 792
VII. ENGINEERING SERVICES AND CGL COVERAGE
ISSU E S .................................................. 796
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY .............................. 797
IX. PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE BOND
REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 798
I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
URING late 2000 and throughout 2001, the developments in
construction and surety law focused on a wide variety of substan-
tive issues, including lien rights, contractor liability, implied war-
ranties, interpretation of the Residential Construction Liability Act,
insurance coverage for defective construction, sovereign immunity for
public owners, and various legislative matters affecting payment and per-
formance bonds. The courts appeared to be quite active in a number of
different areas which directly affect parties to construction contracts.
Possibly as a result of the extensive revisions to the Property Code in
1999, there was little legislative activity which would affect construction
and surety law, with the exception of the additions to the Texas Govern-
ment Code and Texas Property Code which state certain new require-
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ments for payment and performance bonds. The courts appeared to
focus on the interpretation of various statutory provisions, including
some recent amendments to statutes. The courts also focused on address-
ing some unresolved questions involving liability and immunity in the
construction context. The following article summarizes some of the most
significant decisions by the Texas courts.
II. MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIENS
The Texas Supreme Court and various appellate courts considered sev-
eral complex questions regarding the subject of the enforceability of vari-
ous mechanic's and materialman's liens over the past year. The decisions
.analyzed below address the Texas Constitution and its protection of
homestead rights, as well as the Texas Property Code and its rather com-
plex statutory structure which imposes retainage obligations on owners
and notice and filing obligations upon contractors.
A. MECHANIC'S LIENS AND THE TEXAS HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
In Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.,I the Texas Supreme Court inter-
preted the recent revisions to the homestead provisions of the Texas Con-
stitution in order to determine which prerequisites for a lien on a
homestead apply in which circumstances. 2 The case involved a lien dis-
pute in the context of new construction of a homestead property.
Jim Walker Homes ("JWH") contracted with William Spradlin to build
a home and, in the process, secured a lien on Spradlin's homestead. Spra-
dlin contested the validity of the lien by arguing that the lien did not
comply with the procedural protections of subparts (A) through (D) of
Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 50(a)(5).
The trial court granted JWH's motion for summary judgment after de-
ciding that subparts (A) through (D) of Section 50(a)(5) did not apply to
a mechanic's lien for construction of new improvements. 3 The Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed after concluding that "subparts (A) through (D)
apply only to 'work and material used to repair or renovate existing im-
provements' on homestead property, and not to 'work and material used
in constructing new improvements.' ' 4 Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that JWH was not required to comply with the subparts of Section
50 of the Constitution in order to perfect a lien on a homestead. 5
The dispute arose as a result of the 1997 amendments to Section 50 of
the Texas Constitution, which provides in relevant part as follows:
Sec. 50 (a). The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person,
shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of
all debts except for:
1. 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000).
2. Id. at 580-81.
3. Id. at 578.
4. Id. at 581.
5. Spradlin, 34 S.W.3d at 581.
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(5) work and material used in constructing new improvements
thereon, if contracted for in writing, or work and material used to
repair or renovate existing improvements thereon if:
(A) the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the
consent of both spouses, in the case of a family homestead, given
in the same manner as is required in making a sale and convey-
ance of the homestead;
(B) the contract for the work and material is not executed by
the owner or the owner's spouse before the 12th day after the
owner makes written application for any extension of credit for
the work and material... ;
(C) the contract for the work and material expressly provides
that the owner may rescind the contract without penalty or
charge within three days after the execution of the contract by all
parties ... ; and
(D) the contract for the work and material is executed by the
owner and the owner's spouse only at the office of a third-party
lender making an extension of credit for the work and material,
an attorney at law, or a title company. 6
Spradlin argued that JWH's lien was invalid because JWH did not com-
ply with subparts (B) and (D) of Section 50. Spradlin argued that the
subparts of Section 50 should be read broadly to apply to both work and
material used to (1) repair or renovate existing improvements, and (2)
construct new improvements. JWH argued that the amendment, through
its plain language and structure, specifically differentiated between the
repair of existing improvements and the construction of new improve-
ments and that the restrictions of the subparts applied only to the repair
of existing improvements.
The court's decision makes it clear that the prerequisites to perfect a
lien on a homestead will vary substantially, depending upon whether the
work and material which are the subject of the purported lien arise from
new construction or from improvements to an existing homestead. In the
case of improvements to an existing structure, which are most often the
subject of the so-called "equity" loans, the requirements to perfect a lien
are much more extensive. Accordingly, the contractor who intends to
attempt to assert a lien should be aware of the requirements at the time
of the contract process and should carefully follow all of the steps set
forth in the Texas Constitution.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with JWH, holding that subparts (A)
through (D), which follow the language "work and material used to re-
pair or renovate existing improvements" apply only to that scope of
work. 7 The Court's conclusion was based upon the plain language of the
constitution's literal text, as well as the Court's presumption that the Leg-
islature chose its words for the revisions carefully. 8
6. TEX. CONST. Art. XVI, § 50 (a)(5) (Effective Jan. 1, 1998).




B. RETAINAGE LIENS AND CLAIM NOTIcE DEADLINES
In Page v. Structural Wood Components, Inc.,9 the court considered
various questions within the context of statutorily required retainage and
retainage liens. In partially reversing the trial court's decision, the court
of appeals correctly refused to enforce lien rights against an owner's
property but did impose a judgment against the owner personally for re-
tained funds. 10
Page, the property owner, entered into a remodeling contract with
Mark Sepolio d/b/a Custom Concrete & Construction. The contract price
for the scope of work required was $300,000 and was to be paid by peri-
odic progress payments to Sepolio. By the end of March 1998, Page had
paid Sepolio a total of $270,000 for the work which had been completed
as of that date. At that time, the project was not completed. In April
1998, Sepolio refused to complete the work on the project unless he was
first paid the $30,000 remaining on the contract.
As a result of Sepolio's refusal to complete the remodeling, Page termi-
nated the contract with Sepolio on April 14, 1998 and hired substitute
contractors to complete the work. The cost of completion was $27,074.43,
and the work was eventually completed in July 1998. Based upon the
evidence presented at trial, it appeared that Page paid the cost of comple-
tion from his operating accounts.
At the time Page terminated the remodeling contract with Sepolio, Se-
polio owed several subcontractors for goods and services they had pro-
vided for the project. After Sepolio failed to pay Structural Wood
Components ("Wood"), one of the subcontractors, Wood filed a
mechanic's and materialman's lien affidavit against Page's property.
Wood later sued for foreclosure of the lien and for actual damages, nam-
ing both Page and Sepolio as defendants.
At trial, the testimony indicated that Page had withheld the $30,000
from Sepolio as retainage, pursuant to the Texas Property Code. Never-
theless, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Wood and against
Page and Sepolio, declared the lien valid, and ordered foreclosure of the
lien.1
On appeal, Page challenged the validity of the lien and the court's or-
der for foreclosure. The appellate court concluded that, under the circum-
stances, the subcontractor could have perfected a lien on Page's property
under Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code by using one of two meth-
ods: (1) the statutory retainage method (described in Sections 53.103
through 53.105), or (2) the fund-trapping method (described in Section
53.084).12
Based upon the trial testimony, the appellate court found that there
was no evidence that Page had failed to retain ten percent of the contract
9. 57 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.-Houston 2001, no pet. h.).
10. Id. at 530-31.
11. Id. at 526.
12. Id. at 528-29.
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price as required by Section 53.101 of the Texas Property Code. 13 Fur-
thermore, the court found no evidence that Page paid the substitute sub-
contractors with the retained funds withheld from the Sepolio contract.
Accordingly, the court concluded that Wood was not entitled to a
retainage lien on the house, building, structure, fixtures, or improvements
under Section 53.105 of the Property Code, because Page, as the owner,
had properly retained funds on the Sepolio contract. 14
The appellate court noted that, although a fund-trapping claim may
have been permissible under the facts of the case, Wood did not assert a
fund-trapping claim on appeal, so the court found no evidence to support
a fund-trapping lien in favor of Wood. 15 The appellate court concluded
that
[t]he only possible basis for this in rem relief was a retainage lien that
required a failure by Page to retain ten percent of the contract price.
Because there was no evidence of this failure, there was no evidence
to support a retainage lien against the Property or to support the
foreclosure of the lien. 16
Notwithstanding its judgment on the subject of the retainage lien, the
court permitted the trial court's monetary judgment against Page to stand
in the amount of the retained funds withheld under Section 53.101. The
court, citing Mbank El Paso Nat'l Ass'n v. Featherlite Corp.,17 indicated
that the fact that Wood did not have any foreclosure rights did not affect
Wood's right to a monetary judgment for the retained funds, if Wood
provided timely notice of its claim. 18
The central dispute on appeal, with respect to the monetary judgment,
was the timeliness of Wood's required notice to Page. Under Section
53.103 of the Texas Property Code, Wood was required to file a lien affi-
davit no later than thirty days after the work on the project was com-
pleted.1 9 Wood was also required to provide Page with notice of the lien
affidavit by the earlier of the tenth day after the lien affidavit was filed or
the date that the lien affidavit was required to be filed, pursuant to the
version of the statute in effect in 1998.20
The disputes of the parties on the issue of the notice focused on the
proper interpretation of the word "completed" in the context of Section
53.103 of the Property Code. Page maintained that the work in question
was completed in April 1998, upon the termination of Page's contract
13. Page, 57 S.W.3d at 529.
14. Id. at 530.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 792 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
18. Page, 57 S.W.3d at 530.
19. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.103 (Vernon 1995)).
20. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.055, 53.103 (1994 Vernon Supp.)). The
court applied the version of the provisions of Chapter 53 in effect on August 31, 1997. The
primary difference between the statutes in effect on August 31, 1997 and the statutes that
would govern the issues today is the reduction of the time frame in § 53.055. Under the
current statute, the time frame has been reduced from ten days to five. TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 53.055 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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with Sepolio. Conversely, Wood argued that the work was completed in
July 1998, when the substitute subcontractors actually finished all of the
work which was required under the original contract.
After noting that "[t]he mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes
should be liberally construed for the purposes of protecting lien claim-
ants," the court adopted Wood's position on the interpretation of "com-
pleted" and concluded that July 1998 was the applicable date.2' Based
upon that analysis, Wood's deadline for notice and the lien was in August
1998. The court's analysis in the case suggests that the completion date is
determined by the actual completion of the project in question, regardless
of which contractor completes the project. However, its conclusion ap-
pears to be results-oriented, as a means of protecting the unpaid subcon-
tractor in this particular case.
C. FUNDS TRAPPING AND RIGHT TO RETAINAGE
FOLLOWING RELEASE
In Stoltz v. Honeycutt,22 the court considered the issues of fund trap-
ping rights, notices required to trap funds with an owner, and whether a
subcontractor's release of a general contractor serves as a waiver of fund
trapping rights.
In the case, Stoltz entered into a contract with Kyle for improvements
to a commercial property leased by Stoltz. The contract price for the
entire scope of work was $37,858.35. Kyle, the contractor, then subcon-
tracted with Honeycutt to install the air conditioning system for the pro-ject for $7,900. Honeycutt completed the air conditioning installation on
June 7, 1992. After the installation, Kyle failed to pay Honeycutt.
Honeycutt provided notice to Schultz that the $7,900 remained unpaid
and requested that Stoltz withhold Kyle's payment until Kyle paid
Honeycutt.
On June 30, 1992, Kyle, Honeycutt, and Stoltz met in an attempt to
resolve their payment issues. As a result of the meeting, Kyle wrote a
check to Honeycutt for $7,800. The check was post-dated to July 9, 1992.
At the same time, Kyle and Honeycutt entered into an agreement to re-
lease all claims that either of them had against the other. At the same
meeting, Kyle received a check from Stoltz in the amount of $7,858.35 for
the amount owed under the original contract.
On July 17, 1992, Kyle's check was returned to Honeycutt for insuffi-
cient funds. Honeycutt filed an affidavit for a mechanic's and material-
man's lien against the leasehold on August 14, 1992 and later brought
suit. On November 10, 1993, Stoltz obtained a $17,000 indemnity bond in
order to release the subcontractor's lien and sell the business.
In 1997, the disputes were finally tried, and the trial court awarded a
21. Id. at 531 (citing First Nat'l Bank in Graham v. Sledge, 653 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex.
1983)).
22. 42 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston 2001, no pet. h.).
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judgment in favor of Honeycutt. 23 The trial court imposed liability after
concluding that Honeycutt properly gave notice to Stoltz to trap the
funds in Stoltz's possession and that Stoltz failed to properly retain ten
percent from his contract with Kyle for thirty days. Stoltz appealed the
trial court's decision, arguing that the indemnity bond filed by Stoltz pro-
hibited Honeycutt from recovering against him. Stoltz further claimed
that Honeycutt could not recover, because the lien was settled and re-
leased before the lawsuit was filed.
The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding
that, although Honeycutt's claims could survive the indemnity bond, they
did not survive the prior settlement of the claims by Honeycutt.24 The
appellate court noted that Honeycutt had no claim under the fund trap-
ping statute, because the trapping statute only allowed Honeycutt to trap
funds not yet paid by Stoltz to Kyle.25 Since Honeycutt accepted the
check from Kyle and entered into a mutual release with Kyle,
Honeycutt's complaint and ability to trap funds were extinguished.
The appellate court refused Honeycutt's argument that the return of
the check somehow revived Honeycutt's complaint and the right to trap
funds. The court concluded that, once Honeycutt signed the release and
accepted Kyle's check, Honeycutt released its claim against Kyle and
therefore released its right to trap funds under the statute.26 Once the
claim and the right to trap were released, Stoltz paid Kyle the remaining
amount owed. Since Stoltz did not owe Kyle any additional funds under
the original contract, there were no funds for Honeycutt to trap under the
statute.
The appellate court's treatment of the retainage issue causes a bit more
concern. The court noted that, unlike the trapping statute, the retainage
statute does not have a specific provision releasing the owner from his
obligations if the subcontractor's claim is paid or settled.27 The court
therefore concluded that the thirty day provision of the retainage statute
appears to create a strict non-waivable requirement. 28 Specifically, the
statutes referred to by the court provide that "during the progress of
work under an original contract for which a mechanic's lien may be
claimed and for thirty days after the work is completed, the owner shall
retain: (1) ten percent of the contract price of the work to the owner."'29
Under a strict interpretation of the provision, Stoltz violated that require-
ment by paying Kyle the remaining ten percent of the contract prior to
the expiration of thirty days.
23. Id. at 308.
24. Id. Although the court stated that the preferable means to recover under the cir-
cumstances was an action on the bond, the court acknowledged that a claimant does have a
right to pursue a personal judgment against a property owner for the unpaid amounts, even
after the owner obtains a bond to remove the lien from the property. Id. at 312.
25. Id. at 313.
26. Stoltz, 42 S.W.3d at 313.
27. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.101-53.106 (Vernon 1995)).
28. Id. at 314.
29. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.101(a)(1) (Vernon 1995).
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However, the court decided that Stoltz's violation of the statute did not
automatically entitle Honeycutt to the retainage. According to the court,
Honeycutt still had to demonstrate that he (1) gave the required notice
under the property code and (2) filed a lien affidavit before the expira-
tion of the 30 days. Although Honeycutt gave the proper notice,
Honeycutt failed to file the lien affidavit within the requisite period of
time.
Under the terms of the settlement, Honeycutt could not possibly have
filed the lien affidavit within the requisite period of time. The project was
completed on June 7, 1992. Honeycutt accepted a check that was post-
dated to July 9, 1992. Accordingly, Honeycutt could not have filed a lien
affidavit within the 30 day time frame, because Honeycutt could not have
cashed the check within the 30 day window. The court held that "by ac-
cepting the post-dated check, Honeycutt settled his claim against Kyle
and thereby waived any derivative claim he may have had on the retained
amount., 3
0
In arriving at this conclusion, the court ignored the judicial exception
to the 30-day requirement created by the Texas Supreme Court in Gen-
eral Air Conditioning Co. v. Third Ward Church of Christ.31 Under the
judicial exception, an owner's failure to retain the ten percent for 30 days
relieves the claimant's responsibility to file a lien affidavit within the 30
days.32 The justification for the exception was that a lien affidavit claim-
ing an interest in a nonexistent retainage makes no sense. Therefore,
under the exception, where there is no retainage, there is no requirement
that a lien affidavit be filed within 30 days of completion.
The appellate court apparently refused to apply the exception to the
facts at issue on a variety of grounds. First, Stoltz did retain ten percent
as required by the statute. Stoltz paid Kyle the ten percent only after
Kyle and Honeycutt settled their dispute. Secondly, the court relied on
the fact that "Stoltz's failure to retain the funds for 30 days did not inter-
fere with Honeycutt's right to collect on the funds, as Honeycutt had al-
ready extinguished those rights himself."'33 Honeycutt extinguished his
right to collect the funds by accepting a check that was post-dated outside
the 30 day time frame.
III. CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES
During 2001, the Texas Supreme Court rendered a significant opinion
on the subject of a general contractor's liability for negligence to the em-
ployees of subcontractors, which may prove to be controversial when ex-
trapolated to other factual situations. While the facts of the case arguably
justified the imposition of liability upon the general contractor for injury
30. Stoltz, 42 S.W.3d at 314.
31. 426 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1968).
32. Id. at 544.
33. Stoltz, 42 S.W.3d at 314.
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to the employee of a subcontractor, based upon the control and knowl-
edge discussed by the Supreme Court, injured parties will most certainly
argue for a broad application of the rule of law established by the Court.
In Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. v. Harrison,34 the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the general contractor owed a duty of care to the subcon-
tractor, such that the general contractor was liable in negligence for the
injuries sustained by the employee of the subcontractor. 35 In Harrison, a
hospital hired Lee Lewis Construction ("LLC") as the general contractor
to remodel the eighth floor of the hospital and to add ninth and tenth
floors to the existing structure. In the course of completing the work,
LLC subcontracted the interior glass-glazing work to KK Glass. Jimmy
Harrison, an employee of KK Glass, fell to his death while working on
the hospital project. Harrison was not wearing an independent lifeline
that would have stopped his fall. LLC, as the general contractor, retained
the right to control the fall protection systems on the project.
Harrison's family brought a wrongful death and survival action against
LLC, based upon its status as the general contractor on the project. The
family alleged that the general contractor was negligent and grossly negli-
gent. The trial court rendered judgment against the general contractor
for $7.9 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive dam-
ages. 36 The appellate court affirmed the judgment after suggesting a re-
mittitur in the amount of $450,000.00 for unproven pain and suffering
damages.37 The general contractor appealed to the Texas Supreme Court
arguing, among other things, that the general contractor did not owe the
subcontractor a duty of care under the facts at issue. The Texas Supreme
Court rejected LLC's arguments, concluding that there was legally suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that: (1) LLC retained the right to control its
subcontractor's fall-protection measure and therefore owed a legal duty
to Harrison; (2) LLC's failure to ensure adequate fall-protection mea-
sures proximately caused Harrison's fall; and (3) LLC was grossly
negligent. 38
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by stating the general rule:
"[O]rdinarily, a general contractor does not owe a duty to ensure that an
independent contractor performs its work in a safe manner. ' 39 The Court
noted, however, that the general rule is not applicable when the general
contractor retains control over the manner in which the independent con-
tractor performs its tasks.40 The Court cited Section 414 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts with approval:
34. No. 99-0793, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 132 (Tex. Dec. 20, 2001).
35. Id. at *1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Lee Lewis, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 132, at *2.
39. Id. at *5 (citing Elliott-Williams Co. v. Diaz, 9 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex. 1999) and




One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who re-
tains control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to
exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his
control with reasonable care. 41
The court further stated that a "general contractor can retain the right
to control an aspect of an independent contractor's work or project so as
to give rise to a duty of care to that independent contractor's employees
in two ways: by contract or by actual exercise of control." 42
On appeal, the general contractor argued that the family failed to
prove that the general contractor exercised actual control over the sub-
contractor and, therefore, failed to prove that the general contractor
owed a duty under the circumstances. After a careful review of the evi-
dence, the court disagreed. The court concluded that the general contrac-
tor retained the right to control the fall-protection systems on the jobsite
and, therefore, owed a duty to the employees of the subcontractor at the
time of the accident.43
In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused specifically on the follow-
ing evidence of actual control:
1. LLC's owner and president testified that he assigned LLC's job
superintendent "the responsibility to routinely inspect the ninth
and tenth floor addition to the south tower to see to it that the
subcontractors and their employees properly utilized fall protec-
tion equipment."
2. LLC's job superintelident personally witnessed and approved of
the specific fall-protection systems KK Glass used.
3. LLC's job superintendent knew of and did not object to KK
Glass' use of a bosum's chair without an independent lifeline. 44
Lee Lewis appeared to present an extreme set of facts, under which a
fact finder could conclude that the contractor retained all control and all
supervisory responsibilities for worker safety. Accordingly, the Court's
opinion overall appears to be a decision based upon the specific facts of
the case and not a significant shift in position by the Court on the subject
of negligence liability.
Justice Hecht's thoughtful concurring opinion makes that issue clear in
the context of the case's holding. The dissent notes that Section 414 of
the Restatement makes the retention of control over an independent con-
tractor's work a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of liability.45 An
additional prerequisite for liability under that rule, as noted by Justice
Hecht, is that the person harmed be among those "others for whose
41. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965)).
42. Lee Lewis, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 132, at *6 (citing Koch Ref. Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d
153, 155 (Tex. 1999); Coastal Marine Serv. of Texas, Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 226
(Tex. 1999)).
43. Id. at *7-8.
44. Id. at *8.
45. Id. at *21.
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safety the employer owes a duty of reasonable care."'46
The concurrence noted that the court had been called upon to apply
the general rule and exception regarding liability for a subcontractor's
employee's injury in eight separate cases, the analysis of all of which had
focused exclusively on the retention of control question.47
The concurring opinion stated the position that the Lee Lewis case was
one where the additional element concerning the parties to whom the
duty was owed should have been clarified.
IV. CONTRACTUAL AND IMPLIED WARRANTY
ISSUES IN CONSTRUCTION
In the context of general construction disputes, various courts ad-
dressed the question of implied warranties and whether privity is re-
quired for suit against a subcontractor, the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in the context of a construction final payment, and the issue
of substantial completion as a measure of compliance with a construction
contract. One court confirmed that there is no implied warranty of good
and workmanlike performance in an owner/subcontractor context, while
other courts applied the rules of accord and satisfaction and substantial
compliance to determine the rights of the parties to construction con-
tracts. These issues are analyzed more fully below.
A. IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND PRIVITY QUESTIONS
In Codner v. Arellano,48 the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that a
homeowner did not have standing to sue a subcontractor for breach of an
implied warranty of workmanlike performance under the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"). 49 The court reached its conclusion
based upon the reasoning that no public policy exists to permit a home-
owner to sue a subcontractor, because the homeowner's remedy lies with
the general contractor with whom it dealt directly.50
The disputes in Arellano involved the homeowner, the general contrac-
tor he hired, and Road Runner Concrete, the subcontractor hired by the
general to build the foundation for the residence. When the completed
home developed foundation problems, the owner sued both the contrac-
tor and Road Runner for violations of the DTPA and for negligence. At
trial, the owner settled with the contractor but proceeded against Road
Runner. The trial court granted Road Runner a directed verdict on the
plaintiff's claim under the DTPA, and the jury found in favor of Road
Runner on the negligence claim.5 '
46. Id.
47. Lee Lewis, 2001 Tex. LEXIS, at *21.
48. 40 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.).
49. Id. at 673-74.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 668.
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The owner appealed both findings. The court of appeals upheld the
jury's finding of no negligence, and its opinion focused on the question of
whether the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance,
which inures to the benefit of a consumer under the DTPA, extends to a
subcontractor.52
The court determined that the DTPA does not create any warranty, but
rather provides a remedy for a breach of a warranty which is separately
recognized at common law or separately created by statute.5 3 The court
noted that an implied warranty will not be imposed unless there is a
demonstrated, compelling need for the warranty. 54 In addition, the court
concluded that an implied warranty should not be imposed as a matter of
public policy if the owner had an adequate alternative remedy to address
the alleged wrong, including a claim against the general contractor. 55
In the context of its discussion, the court emphasized the fact that the
builder or general contractor in a residential construction contract does
impliedly warrant that the house will be constructed in a good and work-
manlike manner.5 6 It rejected the position that no privity is required for
a DTPA claim in the context of the breach of implied warranty discussion
and emphasized several times that it would decline to apply, as a matter
of public policy, an implied warranty to a dispute between a homeowner
and subcontractor. 57
B. CONTRACT PAYMENTS-THE ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION PRINCIPLE
In Calabrian Chemicals Corp. v. Bailey-Buchanan Masonry, Inc.,58 a
contractor agreed to construct a building for the owner. The compensa-
tion of the contractor was to be computed on a time and material basis.
The dispute centered on whether or not there was a cap of $68,000.00 on
the construction project. The owner maintained that there was a cap,
while the contractor argued that there was no cap on the project.
The construction project ran over the alleged cap, and the owner re-
fused to pay the contractor for any expenses or costs over $68,000.00. A
dispute arose between the contractor and the owner with regard to the
existence of the cap. The owner issued a check to the contractor with the
following notation: "FINAL PAYMENT ON OUR PURCHASE OR-
52. Id. at 671-72.
53. Codner, 40 S.W.3d at 672.
54. Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hosp. Dist., 987
S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1998); Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex. 1995);
Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987); Dennis v. Allison, 698
S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1985)).
55. Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 987 S.W.2d at 53; Dennis, 698 S.W.2d at
96; Humble Nat'l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 224, 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, writ denied)).
56. Id. at 672 (citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561-62 (Tex. 1968)).
57. Id. at 674.
58. 44 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).
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DER 10356 which was not to exceed 68,000." 59 The contractor cashed the
check.
The trial court submitted several questions to the jury, including one
which asked whether the purchase order constituted the complete agree-
ment of the parties. If the jury answered the question in the affirmative,
then the jury was to consider a question addressing the issue of accord
and satisfaction. The jury found that the purchase order did not consti-
tute the entire agreement. Accordingly, the jury did not consider the is-
sue of accord and satisfaction.
The jury concluded that the owner had agreed to pay the contractor on
a time and material basis. 60 The jury also found that the owner had
breached the agreement with the contractor, but that the breach did not
damage the contractor. 61 The trial court disregarded the jury's damages
findings, concluding that the contractor suffered damages in the amount
of $50,548.90 and awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $23,818.50.62
The owner appealed the trial court's decision and argued that it was
entitled to an unconditional submission of accord and satisfaction. The
appellate court agreed.63 According to the appellate court, the check
could have been final payment on the disputed issue, despite the fact that
the purchase order was not the complete agreement.64 Failure to uncon-
ditionally submit the issue of accord and satisfaction to the jury consti-
tuted reversible error. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and
remanded for a new trial where the issue of accord and satisfaction would
be unconditionally submitted.65
C. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE AS THE MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
In Chappell Hill Bank v. Lane Bank Equipment Co.,6 6 the contractor
filed a lien and sued the owner for the balance due on a construction
contract. Under the construction contract, the owner, a bank, hired Lane
Equipment, the contractor, to construct a building to house an ATM.
When the building was nearing completion, the bank began to express
concerns about certain aspects of the construction. The contractor at-
tempted to address the concerns raised. Eventually, the bank stopped
making payments under the contract, and Lane Equipment filed a lien
and brought suit.
Lane Equipment claimed that it was entitled to payments of $1,385.00
for one awning, $4,800 for a security system; sales tax of $396, and
$5,303.02 under the construction contract. The trial court awarded Lane




63. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 49 S.W.3d at 281.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 38 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
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Equipment $6,743.55 in damages and $9,000 in attorney's fees. 67 The
bank appealed, claiming that Lane Equipment was only entitled to sev-
enty-five percent of the contract price because the building was not com-
pleted. On the issue of completion, the trial court submitted the
following question to the jury: "Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that Lane Bank Equipment Company fully complied with all
terms and conditions of the contract in doing the work?" 68
Although the appellate court stated that a substantial performance
question would have been more appropriate under the circumstances, the
appellate court refused to find error in the question submitted by the trial
court.69 The court noted that, in the case of building and construction
contracts, the doctrine of substantial performance by a contractor is often
deemed sufficient to enable the contractor to recover the contract price
less any amounts necessary to remedy any defects in the work.70 In the
particular case, the bank did not object to the submission of the question
based upon full compliance. After reviewing that standard, the appellate
court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that "the jury could prop-
erly find that Lane Equipment had fully complied with all terms and con-
ditions of the contract in doing the work. '71
D. WAIVER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Pending before the Texas Supreme Court, in 2001, was the issue of
whether the purchaser of a new home can waive the implied warranties of
habitability and good and workmanlike construction. Although not de-
cided by the Supreme Court prior to the end of 2001, the issues raised in
the appeal are important ones within the context of construction disputes.
In Buecher v. Centex Homes,72 decided by the San Antonio Court of
Appeals in March 2000, the court held that a home builder would not be
permitted to require a purchaser to sign what the court described as a
"contract of adhesion," which waived the implied warranty of habitability
and good and workmanlike construction in the context of new home con-
struction.73 In its holding, the court supported the continued viability of
Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes.74 The court's reasoning was that it
would be incongruous if public policy required the existence of the im-
plied warranties, yet permitted the waiver or disclaimer of the warranties
in the form of a pre-printed statement form disclaimer in a standard form
contract. 75 The court rejected the builder's argument that Melody Home
67. Id.
68. Id. at 242.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Chappell Hill Bank, 38 S.W.3d at 244.
72. 18 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted).
73. Id. at 810-11.
74. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1997) (holding that the implied warranty to perform repair
services in a good and workmanlike manner cannot be waived).
75. Buecher, 18 S.W.3d at 808.
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prohibits the waiver of implied warranties only in the context of the re-
pair of tangible personal property. 76
The facts of the case centered around Centex's standard form sales
agreement, which contained the following provision intended to waive
the implied warranties of habitability and good and workmanlike
construction:
PURCHASER AGREES TO ACCEPT SAID HOMEOWNER'S
WARRANTY AT CLOSING IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WAR-
RANTIES, WHATSOEVER, WHETHER EXPRESSED OR IM-
PLIED BY LAW, AND INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF GOOD WORKMANLIKE
CONSTRUCTION AND HABITABILITY. PURCHASER AC-
KNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT SELLER IS RELYING
ON THIS WAIVER AND WOULD NOT SELL THE PROPERTY
TO PURCHASER WITHOUT THIS WAIVER. 77
In place of those implied warranties, Centex agreed to deliver its stan-
dard form Limited Home Warranty against defects in workmanship and
materials.
The homeowner argued that the waiver provision violated Section
17.46(b)(12) of the DTPA. Centex argued that the waiver was permissi-
ble because the homeowners would be adequately protected by the Resi-
dential Construction Liability Act. It also argued that the waiver of
implied warranties should be permitted because the express warranties
provided in lieu of the implied warranties would serve a "gap filler" func-
tion, which the implied warranties are intended to satisfy.
The San Antonio Court rejected Centex's arguments, citing the Texas
Supreme Court's adoption of implied warranty law relating to new home
construction in 1968,78 as well as the law of Melody Homes. Based upon
those authorities, the court concluded that the reasoning expressed in
those cases applied equally to new home construction. 79
V. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT
A. RCLA DOES NOT APPLY TO OR PREEMPT RESCISSION CLAIMS
During the past year, the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered
the question of whether the Residential Construction Liability Act
("RCLA") applies to claims for relief other than claims for actual dam-
ages. Although the case was settled during the appeal and the opinion
withdrawn, the court's analysis provides some interesting points for con-
sideration which may be drawn upon in future disputes.
In Perry Homes v. Cams,80 the homeowner sued the builder for dam-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 809.
78. Id. at 811 (citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
79. Id.
80. No. 04-00-00185-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 939 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb.
14, 2001), withdrawn, No. 04-00-00185-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2168 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Apr. 4, 2001).
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ages resulting from certain defects in the construction of a home. Carns,
the homeowner, alleged causes of action which included (1) DTPA viola-
tions, (2) breach of contract, and (3) negligence. Carns sought relief in
the form of rescission or the form of actual damages for repairs and dimi-
nution in value. At trial, the jury concluded that Cams was entitled to
restoration of the home's purchase price pursuant to DTPA section
17.50(b)(3).81
On appeal, Perry Homes argued that Carns' causes of action were pre-
empted by the RCLA. According to Perry Homes, the damages element
of Carns' rescission claim was an action to recover damages under the
RCLA and should, therefore, be governed by the terms of the RCLA. To
the contrary, Carns argued that his claim of rescission was not governed
by the RCLA, because the RCLA applied only when a claimant was
seeking monetary damages.
In the context of its analysis, the court emphasized that monetary dam-
ages and rescission are mutually exclusive remedies, because one is based
upon recovery of benefits under a contract, while the other is based upon
an avoidance of a contract.8 2 While noting the statute's lack of clarity,
the court focused on the specific language of the RCLA, which referred
repeatedly to an "action to recover damages. '83
After carefully reviewing both the text of the RCLA and the legislative
history of the statute in an attempt to determine whether the RCLA
would preempt Carns' causes of action, the court concluded that "[i]f the
homeowner seeks an equitable remedy (like rescission), and not mone-
tary damages, then the RCLA does not preempt the action. If the Legis-
lature had intended the RCLA to apply to any and all claims arising from
a construction defect without regard to the remedy sought, it would have
so stated."'84
The court was careful to note that the RCLA's language did not indi-
cate clearly that the Texas Legislature had intended to replace a claim-
ant's equitable remedy of rescission with an exclusive remedy of
monetary damages.85 The court noted that, to the contrary, the statute
suggests that the Legislature sought to shield builders from liability and
to impose a cap upon monetary damages.86 The court concluded that,
because the Legislature failed to make it clear that the RCLA limits the
type of remedies to be recovered against a homebuilder, the court was
unwilling to recognize such an unstated intent and unwilling to insert ad-
ditional provisions into the act to establish such a limitation.87
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id. at *5.
83. Id. at **7-8 (citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 27.002, 27.003, 27.004, 27.0041,
27.006 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 2000)).
84. id. at *10.
85. Cams, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS at *8.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *11.
[Vol. 55
CONSTRUCTION AND SURETY LAW
The concurring opinion to the case, most interestingly, stated as fol-
lows: "I do not know the correct result in this case; nor do I know how to
decide what it is."'88 The dissent noted that a court's charge is to divine
and effectuate the legislative intent of the statute, but that neither the
statute itself nor its legislative history indicated the true intent or resolved
the issue.89 The concurring opinion concluded that "I thus do not concur
in my colleagues' judgment because I agree with its statement of the law.
In my view, the law will support either result. I concur in the judgment
because I cannot and do not believe the legislature intended to RCLA to
saddle a buyer with a home that is so defective it is not suitable for its
intended purpose. '"90
The concurring opinion is an interesting commentary on the tangled
statute that is the RCLA. It also sheds some light on the reason court
opinions interpreting the RCLA have often seemed so convoluted.
B. RCLA DOES NOT PREEMPT DTPA CLAIM AFTER
UNREASONABLE SETTLEMENT OFFER
In Perry Homes v. Alwattari,91 the court determined that a builder's
failure to make a reasonable settlement offer, as required by the RCLA,
results in a forfeiture by the builder of the protections of the Act and the
ability of the homeowner to pursue other claims, including claims under
the DTPA.92 In the Alwattari case, the plaintiffs purchased a new home
built by Perry Homes. After purchasing the home, the plaintiffs discov-
ered cracks in the foundation. The plaintiffs notified Perry Homes of the
defects in the foundation, and Perry Homes began an investigation.
Perry Homes hired an engineer to inspect the property and take elevation
measurements. The engineer determined that the foundation had shifted.
The plaintiffs demanded that Perry Homes pay for an engineering re-
port, the cost of any necessary repairs, temporary housing during the re-
pairs, the reduction in the house's market value, and attorney's fees.
Perry Homes responded to the plaintiffs' demand by offering to pay sixty
percent of the total cost of installing the piers if the plaintiffs would re-
lease their claims against Perry Homes.
Plaintiffs sued Perry Homes under RCLA and DTPA. At trial, the jury
concluded that Perry Homes' settlement offer was not a reasonable offer
under the RCLA.93 Accordingly, the jury considered the plaintiffs' negli-
gence and DTPA causes of action and found that Perry Homes was liable
under both theories.94
Perry Homes appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the
RCLA preempted the plaintiffs' negligence and DTPA claims. The plain-
88. Id. at *18.
89. Id. at *19-20.
90. Cams, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS at *21.
91. 33 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
92. Id. at 384.




tiffs argued that Perry Homes failed to make a reasonable settlement of-
fer under the RCLA and thereby waived the protections of the RCLA.
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and upheld the judgment of
the trial court. 95
The court's opinion cited the RCLA provision which states that "if a
contractor fails to make a reasonable offer under this section . . . the
limitations on damages and defenses to liability provided for in this sec-
tion shall not apply."'96 The appellate court concluded that Perry Homes'
failure to make a reasonable settlement offer to the plaintiffs resulted in
Perry Homes' loss of the benefit of all limitations on damages and de-
fenses to liability provided for in Section 27.004, including both the limi-
tation on the types of damages recoverable by a homeowner and the
limitation on the amount of damages recoverable by a homeowner. 97 As
a result, the limitations of section 27.004 of the RCLA did not apply, and
because no conflict with the RCLA would exist under the circumstances,
the DTPA action was permitted. 98
VI. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND
INSURANCE COVERAGE
The question of whether an alleged construction defect can ever qualify
as an "occurrence," and trigger an insurer's duty to defend and/or duty to
indemnify in favor of the insured in the context of a commercial liability
policy, continues to raise difficult questions for Texas courts. While the
courts have struggled with such questions, the most recent decisions make
it clear that the Texas state courts are reluctant to expand coverage to
include damages for defective work performed by the insured contractor
itself, as opposed to defective work by a subcontractor or as opposed to
"resulting damage" to a third party's work. However, one decision from
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ap-
pears to raise some questions about the potential expansion of coverage
by that court, depending upon how the injury is alleged in the relevant
pleadings,
A. THE CONTRACTOR'S DEFECTIVE WORK IS
NOT AN "OCCURRENCE"
In Devoe v. Great American Insurance,99 a custom homebuilder was
sued by the purchasers of the home based upon the builder's alleged fail-
ure to construct the residence in question in a good and workmanlike
manner. The purchasers maintained that, as the work on the home pro-
ceeded, a number of flaws became apparent, including improper and defi-
95. Id. at 384.
96. Alwatlari, 33 S.W.3d at 382 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(g) (Vernon
1984 & Supp. 2000)).
97. Id. at 384.
98. Id.
99. 50 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.).
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cient workmanship. The purchasers sued to recover actual damages and
attorney's fees. The homebuilder demanded indemnification by its in-
surer. The insurer denied coverage, based upon its position that the claim
was not covered, because the property damage alleged was not caused by
an "occurrence."
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Great American
Insurance Company, concluding that no "occurrence" was involved, be-
cause the defects alleged were the result of construction methods which
were voluntary and intentional acts by the builder.100 The Austin Court
of Appeals affirmed. 1 1
In the context of the insurance dispute, the Austin court focused on the
question of whether the allegations in the case could ever be construed to
constitute an "accident," and therefore an "occurrence," within the
meaning of the policy in question. The general liability policy in question
contained standard language, providing coverage as follows:
(1)(a) We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of... "property damage" to
which this insurance applies...
(b) This insurance applies to ... "property damage" only if:
(1) the . . . "property damage" is caused by an "occurrence"
that takes place in the "coverage territory" 0 2
The policy defined "occurrence" as an "accident," including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.' 03
The court of appeals noted various arguments made by the purchaser
to attempt to describe the faulty construction at issue as an "occurrence,"
but rejected all such arguments and distinguished the cases cited by the
purchaser. 10 4 The court quite quickly concluded that, because the home
was constructed over a period of time as a voluntary and intentional act
by the insured, the alleged deficiencies did not constitute an accident or
occurrence, even if the poorly constructed home which resulted was un-
expected, unforeseen, or unintended by the builder. 10 5
B. THE "KNOWING" STANDARD DOES NOT ESTABLISH OR
DEFEAT COVERAGE
The Houston court in Hartrick v. Great American Lloyd's Insurance
Co.,10 6 similarly concluded that a builder's breach of an implied warranty
did not qualify as an "accident" and therefore did not trigger coverage
under the insurance policy in question.'0 7 The court found that the dam-
100. Id. at 569.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 570-71.
103. Id. at 571.
104. Devoe, 50 S.W.3d. at 572.
105. Id.
106. 62 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
107. Id. at 272.
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age which resulted from a pitching and heaving foundation was a reason-
ably foreseeable result of not complying with an implied warranty, even if
the builder did not intend for the damage to result.10 8
The court found that the builder's liability was a result of its failure to
comply with the implied promises imposed upon it as a matter of law as a
home builder by not preparing the soil properly and not constructing the
foundation properly.10 9 The court concluded that, because the builder
was responsible for the damages to the home and could have reasonably
foreseen those damages, its acts could not be classified as an "acci-
dent."' 10 Additionally, the court rejected the argument by the homeown-
ers that the builder's acts were an "accident" and therefore an
"occurrence," because the jury failed to find that the builder's acts were
committed knowingly. The court concluded that the "knowing" standard
was applicable only to the DTPA question posed and was not conclusive
on the coverage question."'
C. THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS-NO COVERAGE FOR
DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION
In Malone v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.," 2 an insured contractor was
sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, based upon allegations that it had defectively constructed im-
provements to an office and warehouse complex. The owner's petition
alleged that the contractor negligently constructed the project and failed
to construct the improvements in accordance with the plans and
specifications.
The court, citing Hartrick,113 concluded that the contractor's failure to
comply with the plans and specifications was not an "occurrence" under a
general liability policy, even if the allegations were framed as a negli-
gence claim, and granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. 114
The court concluded that the alleged omissions by the contractor (specifi-
cally the failure to construct the improvements in compliance with the
plans and specifications) were voluntary and intentional in nature, not
accidental, and therefore coverage could not exist. 115
D. THE DEPARTURE-THE "UNEXPECTED" AND
"UNINTENDED" FOCUS
In First Texas Homes, Inc. v. Mid Continental Casualty Co.,1 16 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, applying
108. Id. at 277.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 278.
111. Hartrick, 62 S.W.3d at 278.
112. 147 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
113. 62 S.W.3d 270.
114. Malone, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
115. Id. at 627-28.
116. No. 3-00-CV-1048-BD, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2397 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2001).
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Texas law, concluded, in the context of competing summary judgment
motions, that coverage existed for the allegations of faulty design and
construction made against a builder/developer. 117 The case appears to be
a significant departure from the traditional analysis applied, and it will be
interesting to study how it is received by the courts which continue to
review this coverage issue.
In the case, First Texas, the builder/developer, was sued by a home-
owner for negligence, based upon allegations that a home in question was
not designed or constructed in a good and workmanlike manner, as a
result of certain foundation problems. The homeowner's complaints fo-
cused upon both the design and construction, which were apparently
completed by First Texas itself. First Texas sought coverage under its
general liability policy for the claims asserted against it.
The homeowner urged the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Texas to adopt the approach of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
another Northern District Court, which had previously determined that
defective performance or faulty workmanship by the insured which in-
jures the property of a third party can constitute an "accident" under the
relevant policy definitions. 118
The insurer argued that the court should distinguish the allegations in
the case from prior decisions where the courts' analysis focused on allega-
tions of damage to a third party's work, not the defective work of the
insured itself. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas re-
jected the insurer's arguments and its attempts to distinguish damages to
the insured's work versus a third party's work.119 The court continued to
focus on the question of whether the resulting damages (regardless of
which work was affected) were unexpected and unintended. 20 The court
summarized its analysis as follows: "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether
the insured damaged his own work, but whether the resulting injury or
damage was unexpected and unintended. '121
In its analysis of the issue, the court seemingly rejected, out of hand,
the widely accepted conclusion that a contractor's breach of its own con-
tractual obligations to a homeowner cannot constitute an "occurrence,"
since such a breach results from the intentional acts of the contractor.
The court noted that the allegations made by the homeowner (that the
home was not of proper quality and the foundation was insufficient)
could be construed to support a claim that the damage sustained by the
homeowner was not expected or intended from the standpoint of the
117. Id. at *10-11.
118. Id. at *8. The homeowner urged the Court to adopt the reasoning of Federated
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1999);
Hartford Casualty Co. v. Cruse, 938 F.2d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1991); and E&R Rubalcava
Construction, Inc. v. Burlington Insurance Co., 147 F. Supp.2d 523 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
119. Id. at *8-9.
120. Id. at *9.




VII. ENGINEERING SERVICES AND CGL COVERAGE ISSUES
In Utica Lloyd's of Texas v. Sitech Engineering Corp.,123 the Texarkana
Court of Appeals analyzed the professional services exclusion of the com-
mercial general liability insurance policy, concluding that the exclusion is
unambiguous and clearly excluded coverage for alleged negligence by the
engineering firm on the construction project. 124
The survivors of a construction worker who was killed in a trench cave-
in sued the engineering firm on the project, alleging that the insured engi-
neering firm was negligent in (1) failing to make daily site inspections, as
required by the contract; (2) designing the excavation system in a way
which failed to indicate the slope for the spoil pile adjacent to the trench;
and (3) misrepresenting its qualifications to prepare the project's safety
requirements. One of the amended petitions filed by the survivors al-
leged that certain of the negligent acts were performed by both engineer-
ing and non-engineering personnel.
The engineering firm's CGL insurer filed suit, requesting a declaratory
judgment that the allegations made did not trigger coverage under the
applicable policy and that the professional services exclusion specifically
barred coverage. The professional services exclusion stated, in relevant
part, as follows:
This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury".. . arising out of the
rendering or failure to render any professional services by or for you,
including:
1. The preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve maps,
drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, designs or speci-
fications; and
2. Supervisory, inspection or engineering services.' 25
The trial court concluded that the application of the exclusion was am-
biguous due to the estate's allegations that some of the insured's negli-
gent acts were committed by non-engineering personnel. 1 26 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion unambiguously applied to
the precise allegations made in the case, since the exclusion clearly de-
fines what constitutes professional services.' 27
The court concluded that the factual allegations made against the in-
sured did not change in any way when they were amended to claim that
some acts were performed by non-engineering personnel, since the alle-
gations still fell squarely within the scope of the exclusion: improper in-
spection or failure to inspect, negligent design, and misrepresentations. 28
122. Id. at *10.
123. 38 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
124. Id. at 264.
125. Id. at 263.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 264.
128. Utica, 38 S.W.3d at 264.
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The court properly determined that the type of allegations made would
potentially be governed by or insured by a professional liability policy,
not the CGL policy.
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of waiver within
the context of a sovereign immunity claim in General Services Commis-
sion v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.129 The Court's opinion resulted from the
consolidation of two cases: (1) General Services Commission v. Little-Tex
Insulation Co. and (2) Texas A&M University v. DalMac Construction
Co., both of which analyzed sovereign immunity as a defense and waiver
as an exception to that defense.
In the underlying dispute from Texas A&M University v. DalMac,
DalMac sued the University for damages arising out of a construction
contract. The trial court granted Texas A&M University's plea to the ju-
risdiction, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded. 130 The court
of appeals concluded that DalMac was entitled to conduct discovery in
order to prove that the University waived its immunity from suit.131
In the underlying case, General Services v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.,
Little-Tex was awarded a state contract for asbestos abatement. After a
dispute arose between the state and Little-Tex, Little-Tex filed sued in
district court. As in DalMac, the trial court granted the state's plea to the
jurisdiction. 132 The appellate court reversed and remanded after conclud-
ing that the state waived its immunity from suit by accepting the benefits
from Little-Tex's performance of the contract.133
In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether or not the
state could waive its sovereign immunity through the judicially created
exception of waiver-by-conduct. In its earlier opinion in Federal Sign v.
Texas Southern University,134 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
State's act of contracting for goods and services did not automatically
waive its immunity from suit.135 However, the Court "expressly left open
the question of whether the State's conduct may waive its immunity from
suit."'1 36 In the wake of Federal Sign, several courts (including the two
appellate courts involved in the underlying disputes) concluded that the
State could waive its immunity by accepting benefits under a contract.
In an apparent response to Federal Sign and the developing case law,
the Texas Legislature enacted what is now Chapter 2260 of the Texas
Government Code. According to the Texas Supreme Court, "Chapter
2260 retains sovereign immunity from a suit in breach-of-contract cases
129. 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001).




134. 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
135. Id. at 408.
136. Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 595 (citing Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 408 n.1).
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against the State but provides an administrative process to resolve those
claims."' 137 According to Section 2260.001(1) of the Texas Government
Code, the administrative scheme enacted by the Legislature applies to all
written contracts for the sale of goods, services, or construction.
138
Little-Tex and DalMac attempted to evade the provisions of Chapter
2260 by arguing that the State waived any claim to sovereign immunity by
accepting benefits under the construction contracts at issue. Specifically,
Little-Tex and DalMac argued that Chapter 2260 did not apply to waiver-
by-conduct cases, because "a party seeking redress under a waiver-by-
conduct theory is not seeking permission under Chapter 107.' 139 Accord-
ing to Little-Tex and DalMac, consent was not required because the State
waived its immunity by conduct. Both Little-Tex and DalMac argued
that "if consent under Chapter 107 is not necessary, then, logically,
neither is compliance with Chapter 2260."140
The Texas Supreme Court refused to adopt Little-Tex's and DalMac's
arguments and concluded "that there is but one route to the courthouse
for breach-of-contract claims against the State, and that route is through
the Legislature." 14 1 The court concluded that, under the new scheme set
forth in the Government Code, "a party simply cannot sue the State for
breach of contract absent legislative consent under Chapter 107. Compli-
ance with Chapter 2260, therefore, is a necessary step before a party can
petition to sue the State."' 42 According to the court, the Legislature
"foreclosed the possibility for a waiver-by-conduct exception to the
State's immunity from suit in certain breach-of-contract claims."'
1 43
The court carefully noted in its opinion the distinction between immu-
nity from suit and immunity from liability. The court concluded that,
while the state waives immunity from liability when it contracts as would
a private citizen, it does not also waive immunity from suit. Chapter 2260
establishes the administrative claims resolution procedure which applies
to such claims, and a party must comply with Chapter 2260 in order to
obtain consent to sue a public entity.'
44
IX. PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE BONDS
The Texas Property Code and the Texas Government Code were re-
vised in 2001 to include certain additional provisions governing the infor-
mation that must be contained in payment and performance bonds, how
notice may be given, and related issues.
137. Id.
138. TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2260.001(1) (Vernon 2000).
139. Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 596.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 597.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 600.
144. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2260 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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A. PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BOND FORMS
The substantive content required to be contained in the forms used as
payment and performance bonds has been amended, with the addition of
certain additional elements now set forth in parts of Section 2253 of the
Texas Government Code and in parts of Section 53 of the Texas Property
Code. 145
In particular, the new provisions require that every performance bond
and payment bond required by the statutes display the name, mailing ad-
dress, physical address, and telephone number of the surety company
which issued the particular bond or, in the alternative, display the toll
free telephone number maintained by the Department of Insurance
(DOI) and a statement that the address of the surety company to which
any notice of claim should be sent may be obtained from the DOI by
calling the toll free number.146
The statutes provide that the additional required information can be
attached to the bond or displayed on the bond itself. 147
Section 2253.021, which sets forth the basic requirements for the use of
payment and performance bonds on public projects, now provides as
follows:
1. Texas Government Code § 2253.021. Performance and Payment
Bonds Required
(a) A governmental entity that makes a public work contract with a
prime contractor shall require the contractor, before beginning
the work, to execute to the governmental entity:
(1) a performance bond if the contract is in excess of $ 100,000;
and
(2) a payment bond if the contract is in excess of $ 25,000.
(b) The performance bond is:
(1) solely for the protection of the state or governmental entity
awarding the public work contract;
(2) in the amount of the contract; and
(3) conditioned on the faithful performance of the work in
accordance with the plans, specifications, and contract docu-
ments.
(c) The payment bond is:
(1) solely for the protection and use of payment bond benefi-
ciaries who have a direct contractual relationship with the prime
contractor or a subcontractor to supply public work labor or
material; and
(2) in the amount of the contract.
145. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2253.021, 2253.024(a), 2253.026, 2253.048; TEX. PROP.





(d) A bond required by this section must be executed by a corpo-
rate surety in accordance with Section 1, Chapter 87, Acts of the
56th Legislature, Regular Session, 1959 (Article 7.19-1,
Vernon's Texas Insurance Code).
(e) A bond executed for a public work contract with the state or a
department, board, or agency of the state must be payable to
the state and its form must be approved by the attorney general.
A bond executed for a public work contract with another gov-
ernmental entity must be payable to and its form must be
approved by the awarding governmental entity.
(f) A bond required under this section must clearly and promi-
nently display on the bond or on an attachment to the bond:
(1) the name, mailing address, physical address, and telephone
number, including the area code, of the surety company to
which any notice of claim should be sent; or
(2) the toll-free telephone number maintained by the Texas
Department of Insurance under Article 1.35D, Insurance Code,
and a Statement that the address of the surety company to
which any notice of claim should be sent may be obtained from
the Texas Department of Insurance by calling the toll-free tele-
phone number.
(g) A governmental entity may not require a contractor for any
public building or other construction contract to obtain a surety
bond from any specific insurance or surety company, agent, or
broker.' 48
Likewise, Section 53.202 of the Texas Property Code requires as
follows:
2. Texas Property Code § 53.202 Bond Requirements
The bond must:
(1) be in a penal sum at least equal to the total of the original con-
tract amount;
(2) be in favor of the owner;
(3) have the written approval of the owner endorsed on it;
(4) be executed by:
(A) the original contractor as principal; and
(B) a corporate surety authorized and admitted to do business
in this state and licensed by this state and licensed by this state to
execute bonds as surety, subject to Section 1 Chapter 87, Acts of
the 56th Legislature, Regular Session, 1959 (Article 7.19-1,
Vernon's Texas Insurance Code);
(5) be conditioned on prompt payment for all labor, subcontracts,
materials, specifically fabricated materials, and normal and usual ex-
tras not exceeding 15 percent of the contract price; and
(6) Clearly and prominently display on the bond or on an attach-
ment to the bond
148. TEX. Gov'T COE ANN. § 2253.021 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Presently there are two
subsections labeled "(f)." The error will certainly be corrected the next legislative session.
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(A) the name, mailing address, physical address, and telephone
number, including the area code, of the surety company to which
any notice of claim should be sent; or
(B) the toll-free telephone number maintained by the Texas de-
partment of insurance under article 1.35d, insurance code, and a
statement that the address of the surety company to which any
notice of claim should be sent may be obtained from the Texas
department of insurance by calling the toll-free telephone
number. 149
B. RESPONSIVE INFORMATION REQUIRED
Section 2253.024 of the Texas Government Code, which specifies the
information a contractor must provide to a subcontractor, now also re-
quires the provision of the name of the surety issuing the payment bond
and the performance bond, and the toll-free telephone number main-
tained by the Texas Department of Insurance under Article 1.35D, Insur-
ance Code, for obtaining information concerning licensed insurance
companies.1 50
In addition, Section 2253.026 of the Texas Government Code, which
imposes the requirement upon governmental entities to furnish bond in-
formation upon request, now specifies that the governmental entity, shall,
upon receipt of a request, provide the following:
(1) a certified copy of a payment bond and any attachment to the
bond;
(2) the public work contract for which the bond was given; and
(3) the toll-free telephone number maintained by the Texas Depart-
ment of Insurance under Article 1.35D, Insurance Code, for ob-
taining information concerning licensed insurance companies. 151
C. SATISFYING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Additions to both the Texas Government Code and the Texas Property
Code now establish that a person satisfies the notice requirements under
the bonds if the person mails the required notice by certified mail to the
surety either (1) at the address on the bond or the attachment to the
bond, or (2) at the address on file with the DOI, and (3) at any other
address allowed by law. 152
D. CLAIMS HANDLING
Chapter 7 of the Insurance Code has been amended with the addition
of Article 7.20, which regulates claims handling practices for payment
bond sureties. The new provisions of Chapter 7 set forth a definition of
149. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.202 (Vernon 2000).
150. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2253.024 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
151. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2253.026 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
152. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2253.048 (Vernon Supp. 2002); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.206(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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"notice of claim" and the dates for acceptance or rejection and payment
of a claim.153
Moreover, the new provisions authorize the Department of Insurance
to promulgate regulations to enforce the new article, "in the event a
surety company violates this article as a general business practice. '154
The legislation is a compromise measure negotiated between the surety
industry and subcontractors.
153. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. Art. 7.20 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
154. Id.
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